Republican Constitutionalism by Solum, Lawrence B.






Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Solum, Lawrence B., "Republican Constitutionalism" (2017). Constitutional Commentary. 8.
http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/8




OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING 
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE 
PEOPLE. By Randy E. Barnett.2 New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers. 2016. Pp. xiv + 283. $26.99 (cloth). 
Lawrence B. Solum3 
INTRODUCTION: “REPUBLICANISM” IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
In Our Republican Constitution,4 Professor Randy Barnett 
articulates a vision of republican constitutionalism grounded on a 
conception of individual sovereignty; the central function of a 
republican constitution is the protection of the liberty of “We the 
People, each and every one.”5 Although the conception of 
individual sovereignty is a recent development in Barnett’s work, 
the theme of liberty runs throughout Barnett’s work over his 
whole career and is especially prominent in two prior books, The 
Structure of Liberty6 and Restoring the Lost Constitution.7 
The key development in Our Republican Constitution is the 
articulation of two competing conceptions of American 
constitutionalism, a republican conception and a democratic 
conception.8 Although much of the book is historical and 
 
 1. Copyright by the author 2016. 
 2.  Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory; Director, Georgetown Center 
for the Constitution. 
 3. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
 4. RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE 
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016). 
 5. The formulation, “We the People, each and everyone one,” appears throughout 
Our Republican Constitution. See, e.g., id. at 23, 65, 122. 
 6. RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY (2d ed. 2014). 
 7. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2014). 
 8. Id. at 18. Barnett calls the two conceptions “visions.” Id. More precisely, we can 
say that the concept of constitutionalism is contested and that there are distinct 
conceptions of constitutionalism, two of which are the republican conception and the 
democratic conception identified by Barnett. On the concept-conception distinction, see 
W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 167 
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expository, the central aim of the book is to develop a narrative 
of republican constitutionalism for those Americans who are 
committed to limited federal power, a robust doctrine of 
separation of powers, and protection of the natural rights of 
citizens. This vision is contrasted to an opposing narrative of 
democratic constitutionalism that would attract those who are 
drawn to plenary and virtually unlimited national power, the 
administrative state, and a limited conception of judicially 
enforceable unenumerated rights. Barnett does not hide his cards: 
he is for republican constitutionalism and against its democratic 
rival. 
This essay brings the ideas presented in Our Republican 
Constitution into juxtaposition with two other important ideas in 
the broad tradition of republican constitutional thought. The first 
of these ideas is virtue (or human excellence) in the classic or 
Aristotelian sense of that word. The second idea is liberty as that 
concept was understood in republican political thought. Once 
these two ideas are brought into conversation with the notion of 
individual sovereignty, we can begin to glimpse a revised vision of 
republican constitutionalism. Although this vision has much in 
common with that offered by Professor Barnett, there are 
differences as well. 
The central aim of this essay is explication of a republican 
conception of constitutionalism that is related to but different 
from the version offered by Barnett. But at the very outset of that 
exploration, we encounter a problem. The word “republican” 
(either large or small case “R”) is ambiguous: it has more than 
one conventional semantic meaning.9 The ways in which 
“republican” is used in American constitutional discourse connect 
to the civic republican tradition in political thought10 and to the 
Republican Party.11 The civic republican tradition itself has a long 
 
(1956). It was later deployed by John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
(1971). 
 9. The Oxford English Dictionary definitions make it clear that the term 
“republican” and the root word “republic” have a wide variety of meanings. Republican, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010). 
 10.  For a discussion of the nature of “republicanism,” see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1699 (1989) 
(“So the question cries out: is the republicanism that is currently being ‘revived’ the 
republicanism famously studied by historians like Pocock and Gordon Wood, or is it some 
reformulated modern version?”). 
 11. See Jamal Greene et. al., Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 360 
(2011) (“Originalism is part of a bundle of ostensibly methodological commitments that 
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history, from Aristotle to classical Rome, renaissance Italy, and 
the Whig tradition in English politics.12 And the use of the term 
“Republican” in connection with American party politics also has 
a long history, as the Republican Party itself has changed over 
time. 
As used in academic constitutional scholarship, “republican” 
and its variations are theoretical terms, employed in the specialist 
discourses of constitutional theory, political science, history, and 
philosophy. It would be remarkable and unexpected if 
“republican” had a single meaning in all of these academic 
contexts; in part, the technical academic meanings refract the 
various meanings associated with the history of the term in the 
evolution of political thought and party politics. Given these 
complications, it is unlikely that contemporary theorists currently 
agree on a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
application of the theoretical phrase “republican constitutional 
theory.” But in the absence of a clear concept, we risk talking past 
one another. 
Our Republican Constitution articulates a vision of 
“republican” constitutionalism, but some critics have objected 
that Barnett’s use of the term “republican” differs from both the 
understanding of “republican” in the civic republican tradition as 
that tradition influenced the early American republic and 
“Republican” in the history of the Republican Party (or really 
“parties”13) in the United States.14 And some critics might even 
argue that Barnett does not understand “civic republicanism” as 
it existed in the Founding era or that he fails to grasp the 
constitutional stance of the contemporary and historical 
Republican Party. Of course, Barnett makes it clear that he is 
using the phrase “republican constitutionalism” in a stipulated 
sense (p. 27), so these criticisms are obviously incorrect if they are 
read literally. Barnett is aware that his usage of the word 
“republican” is different from other usages, and it seems highly 
likely that his critics know that he is not asserting that his vision 
 
opinion leaders and the media associate with the Republican Party, and so it is hardly 
surprising that originalists seem to support conservative outcomes.”). 
 12. See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975).  
 13. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 9, for a general sense of the 
various political parties that have been called “Republican.” 
 14. See Sanford Levinson, Randy Barnett’s Disdain for Democracy (and John 
Marshall)?, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 113 (2016); see also Jack M. Balkin, Which Republican 
Constitution?, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 31 (2016). 
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of republican constitutionalism is identical to the “civic 
republicanism” of the Founding or the orthodox view of the 
Republican Party today or at any particular period in American 
history. 
What is going on? Why does Barnett want to claim the word 
“republican” for his normative constitutional vision? And why 
would his critics want to deny him use of this term, insisting 
instead that he use other words, such as “liberal” or 
“libertarian”?15 Demanding clarity is a legitimate and important 
scholarly move, but there is no lack of clarity in Barnett’s 
deployment of the term “republican” as a label for his 
constitutional theory. Barnett and his critics could simply 
stipulate definitions and then move on, but they do not. Why not? 
There is another way to conceptualize Barnett’s use of the 
term “republican” and his critics’ resistance to this move. In my 
view, Barnett and his critics are engaging in what philosophers of 
language call “metalinguistic negotiation”16—the process by 
which the meaning of words like “republican” and phrases like 
“republican constitutionalism” are contested (adversarially) or 
negotiated (cooperatively). I will use the phrase “metalinguistic 
contestation” to refer to the process of metalinguistic negotiation 
in its adversarial (as opposed to cooperative) form. 
A central aim of Barnett’s Our Republican Constitution is to 
engage in metalinguistic contestation over the meaning of the 
phrase “republican constitution” by articulating a normative 
constitutional theory and showing the connections between that 
theory and various uses of the words “republican” and 
“republicanism” in both American history and contemporary 
constitutional politics. In other words, Barnett aims to infuse the 
phrase “republican constitution” with the normative content 
provided by his vision of constitutional theory. His effort at 
metalinguistic contestation is aimed at intellectuals and political 
 
 15. See Balkin, supra note 14, at 31 (arguing that Barnett’s view is “natural rights 
liberalism”); Levinson, supra note 14, at 114 (arguing that Barnett should have called his 
position “anti-democratic”); id. at 118 (suggesting that Barnett’s position should be called 
“liberal” or “libertarian”). 
 16. David Plunkett and Timothy Sundell, Disagreement and the Semantics of 
Normative and Evaluative Terms, 13 PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT 23 (2013); David Plunkett 
and Timothy Sundell, Dworkin’s Interpretivism and the Pragmatics of Legal Disputes, 19 
LEGAL THEORY 3 (2013); David Plunkett and Timothy Sundell, Antipositivist Arguments 
from Legal Thought and Talk: The Metalinguistic Response in PRAGMATISM, LAW, AND 
LANGUAGE 56–75. (G. Hubb and D. Lind eds. 2014). 
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leaders associated with the contemporary Republican Party—
some of whom may be academics but most of whom are not. 
Barnett is articulating a vision for republican constitutionalism for 
Republicans and contrasting that to a vision of democratic 
constitutionalism associated with Democrats. He is entering into 
contemporary constitutional politics from a perspective rooted in 
constitutional theory and history, but he speaks to a 
contemporary audience from a contemporary perspective. 
Barnett’s metalinguistic strategy is narrative in form. He 
constructs a grand “republican narrative” (p. 250)—a story about 
American constitutional development that associates his 
normative theory of constitutionalism with the idea of a 
“republic” in the sense in which a republic is contrasted with 
“majoritarian democracy” (p. 58). Barnett’s narrative aims to 
create an association between his metalinguistic proposal for the 
meaning of the phrase “republican constitution” and the political 
identity of readers who affiliate with the Republican Party or vote 
for Republican candidates. If Barnett’s book succeeds, the 
political identity of being a “Republican” will come to be 
associated with endorsing the “republican constitution” and 
opposing the “democratic constitution.” 
One might be tempted to conflate Barnett’s use of narrative 
in metalinguistic contestation with the kind of intellectual history 
that is associated with writings by professional historians about 
“civic republicanism,”17 but this would be a grave conceptual 
error. Barnett is not trying to unearth the historical meaning of 
the phrase “republican constitution” in the early republic or 
later—rather, his aim is to engage in metalinguistic contestation 
that creates new meaning for that phrase. Structurally, Barnett’s 
move is similar to the attempt by progressive constitutional 
scholars to associate “civic republicanism” with a contemporary 
progressive constitutional theory.18 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that Barnett did not use 
the phrase “Our Liberal Constitution” as the title for his book—
despite the urging of critics that he do so.19 Given the 
 
 17. See POCOCK, supra note 12, and the discussion by Fallon, supra note 10, for 
references to the kind of historical writing to which the text accompanying this footnote 
refers. 
 18. See generally Fallon, supra note 10 (discussing relationship between republican 
revival and historical civic republicanism). 
 19. See Balkin, supra note 14, at 1; Levinson, supra note 14, at 2, 6. 
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contemporary political valence of the term “liberal,” that title 
would have been counterproductive, a laughable error of 
authorial judgment. Indeed, it seems unlikely that any members 
of the intended audience for the book would bother to read it, if 
it had that title, whereas a book entitled “Our Republican 
Constitution” might grab their attention. Members of the 
Republican Party will not endorse “Our Liberal Constitution”—
because the contemporary meaning of the word “liberal” in 
political contexts is diametrically opposed to their political 
commitments.20 
My aim in this paper will not be to engage directly in 
metalinguistic contestation over the phrase “republican 
constitutionalism.” Instead, for the purposes of this paper, I will 
treat “republican constitutional theory” as a family resemblance 
concept.21 There is a variety of positions in constitutional theory 
that are called “republican.” Some of the positions that are called 
“republican” share common features with each other. There may 
be a series of overlaps, such that each member of the republican 
family of constitutional theories is a member of a conceptual 
network—having some features in common with adjacent 
positions. But it may well be the case that at the edges of the 
network, there are theories that are called “republican” but have 
very few common elements, perhaps none. I will articulate a 
version of republican constitutional theory, but I am not making 
an attempt to claim that the phrase “republican 
constitutionalism” should be exclusively associated with the 
theory I articulate as opposed to other versions of constitutional 
republicanism. 
One strand of republican constitutional theory draws on what 
is called “civic republicanism.”22 The revival of civic republican 
ideas in constitutional theory coalesced in the 1980s—Frank 
 
 20. See Liberal, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (defining liberal as 
“favouring social reform and a degree of state intervention in matters of economics and 
social justice; left-wing”). 
 21. For the idea of a family resemblance concept, see LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 67, at 32 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., MacMillan Co. 
1953); G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, WITTGENSTEIN: UNDERSTANDING AND MEANING 
320–43 (1980). 
 22. See generally Frank Lovett, Republicanism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/republicanism; see also Philip Pettit, 
Republicanism (2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/republicanism 
(prior version of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry). 
8 - SOLUM_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/17 9:06 AM 
2017] REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 181 
 
Michelman, Cass Sunstein, and Mark Tushnet are particularly 
associated with this moment in the development of constitutional 
thought.23 Another set of republican ideas is strongly associated 
with Philip Pettit’s work in political philosophy and in particular 
with his notion of republican freedom.24 Both of these 
developments have been largely independent of what is 
sometimes called “virtue ethics”—which in one form is focused 
on the development of Aristotelian ideas about the role of virtue 
and character using the tools of contemporary moral philosophy.25 
The version of republican constitutionalism proffered in this essay 
brings these strands together, sketching a constitutional theory 
that emphasizes republican virtue and republican freedom as 
foundational concepts in a (but not the) republican 
constitutionalism. 
The version of republican constitutionalism here is a sketch 
and not a fully developed theory. It is offered for the purpose of 
illuminating and questioning the ideas about republican 
constitutionalism developed by Randy Barnett in Our Republican 
Constitution and should not be understood as representing my 
own mature ideal constitutional theory. Although I do have a 
theory-in-progress that sets out an account of constitutional 
interpretation and construction in the context of the United States 
Constitution,26 I have not developed an ideal normative theory of 
constitutionalism—although it would be fair to regard the 
remainder of this essay as a think piece that could serve as a 
preliminary step towards the development of such a theory. The 
ideas presented here are related to my prior work in virtue 
 
 23. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 
1493, 1495 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 
1576-89 (1988) (describing the impact of republicanism upon several modern public law 
controversies and suggesting that an understanding of republicanism requires a 
reformation of legal rules). 
 24. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND 
GOVERNMENT (1997). 
 25. Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2012), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue. 
 26. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Original Meaning of the 
Constitutional Text, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015); Lawrence B. Solum, What Is 
Originalism? in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY (Grant Huscroft and Bradley W. Miller eds., Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
453, 486–87 (2013). 
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jurisprudence27 and aretaic constitutional theory,28 but in my own 
view, my thoughts remain inchoate and underdeveloped. 
Here is the road map. Part I explicates a theory of republican 
virtue that draws on Aristotle’s theory of the human excellences 
as developed in contemporary virtue ethics, arguing that virtue is 
both a necessary means and the primary end of a republican 
constitution. Part II turns to the notion of republican liberty (or 
freedom)—again rooted in classical thought but developed in 
modern form by Philip Pettit: republican constitutions should aim 
to create, protect, and preserve republican liberty. Part III 
integrates these two ideas into a republican theory of 
constitutionalism and explains the ways in which republican virtue 
and republican liberty might provide a normatively attractive 
constitutional vision that supplements, extends, and enriches the 
vision offered in Our Republican Constitution. 
I. REPUBLICAN VIRTUE 
The connection between republican political theory and 
virtue has been widely discussed.29 The version of republican 
constitutionalism on offer here connects with virtue or human 
excellence in two ways, as both means to and the end of a 
republican constitution. First, for a republican constitution to 
function well, officials (legislators, executives, and judges) must 
possess the virtues—especially the virtues of practical wisdom and 
justice—in sufficient numbers and to a sufficient degree. Second, 
a republican constitution aims to create human flourishing, and 
only virtuous citizens can flourish. 
 
 27. Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue as the End of Law: An Aretaic Theory of Legislation, 
JURISPRUDENCE (forthcoming 2016). 
 28. Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. 
REV. 475 (2005). 
 29. See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY 
AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY (stating that “if citizens are to keep the republic to its proper 
business, they had better have the collective and individual virtue to track and contest 
public policies and initiatives” is a “core idea” of “republican thought”) (2012); John B. 
Mitchell, My Father, John Locke, and Assisted Suicide: The Real Constitutional Right, 3 
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 43, 88 (2006) (“The philosophy of Civic Republicanism revolved 
around the notion of civic virtue.”); David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in 
Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 623 (2001) (“While civic virtue was an essential 
element of classical republicanism, the new republican theorists barely mention virtue as 
an indispensable element of civic republicanism.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in 
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31 (1985) (stating that the “animating 
principle” of the republican conception of politics was “civic virtue”). 
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We will begin with a sketch of a relatively thick theory of the 
human excellences that draws on Aristotle and is closely related 
to contemporary virtue ethics.30 
A. THE MODEL THEORY OF THE VIRTUES 
There are many theories of human excellence. Among the 
possible approaches are accounts of virtue drawn from Aristotle, 
the Stoics, Hume, and Confucius.31 On this occasion and in other 
work, I have adopted a theory of the virtues that draws on Neo-
Aristotelian ideas, incorporating modified versions of Aristotle’s 
account of flourishing and the virtues. This is a “model theory” or 
perhaps more realistically a “toy theory.” The model theory is a 
simplified version of ideas from contemporary virtue ethics—and 
owes a great debt to work by Rosalind Hursthouse32 and Gavin 
Lawrence.33 On this occasion, the theory is simply laid out; of 
course, a full version of the theory would need to defend 
Aristotle’s account of the virtues against its rivals and 
demonstrate its consistency with contemporary cognitive science. 
Before proceeding further, we should note that the theory of 
the virtues on offer here is not limited to “civic virtues”—virtues 
connected to participation in civic life.34 As opposed to a thin 
theory of civic virtues, the account offered here is a thick theory 
of the human excellences. The so-called civic virtues are merely 
applications or instantiations of the dispositional qualities that are 
both preconditions for and constitutive of human flourishing. 
The model theory of the virtues connects with the idea of 
eudaimonia—which can be translated as “happiness” or 
“flourishing.” Individual humans flourish when they lead lives 
that focus on rational and social activities that express the human 
excellences. Thus, flourishing is a characteristic of whole lives and 
not of individual moments. Flourishing is a function of activity—
and in particular the kinds of activity that express human nature 
as rational and social. This means that mental states, such as 
 
 30. See Solum, supra note 27. The account of republican virtue offered here draws 
heavily on prior work.  
 31. For exploration of a Confucian approach, see Lawrence Solum and Linghao 
Wang, Confucian Virtue Jurisprudence in LAW, VIRTUE AND JUSTICE (Amalia Amaya & 
Ho Hock Lai, eds., Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012). 
 32. ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (Oxford University Press 1999). 
 33. Gavin Lawrence, Human Excellence in Character and Intellect in A COMPANION 
TO ARISTOTLE 419–70 (Georgios Anagnostopoulos ed.) (2013). 
 34. See supra text accompanying note 29 for discussion of “civic virtues.” 
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pleasure or satisfaction, are not forms of flourishing—although 
flourishing may produce such positive mental states. Flourishing 
requires rational activity, because humans are creatures that 
reason and can act on the basis of reasons. Flourishing requires 
social activity, because humans are social creatures whose nature 
is to communicate and interact with one another. But not just any 
rational or social activity will do. Human flourishing involves 
activities that express the human excellences or virtues. 
What are the human excellences? They are the dispositional 
qualities that are a constitutive part of human flourishing. 
Following Aristotle, the model theory identifies moral and 
intellectual virtues. Although Aristotle classified the virtue of 
justice as a moral virtue, the model theory will treat justice as a 
distinct category. 
The moral virtues, including courage, good temper, and 
temperance, are dispositions with respect to morally neutral 
emotions, respectively fear, anger, and desire. Thus, a courageous 
human is disposed to feel the emotion of fear in a way that is 
proportionate to the threat or danger that elicits the fear and to 
respond to the emotion properly. The vice of cowardice 
characteristically involves the disposition to disproportionate or 
exaggerated fear. The vice of rashness characteristically involves 
a disposition to fear that does not adequately reflect the danger, 
and hence is associated with inappropriate risk-taking. A similar 
pattern exists with respect to the emotion of anger and the 
associated virtue of good temper, and the emotion of desire and 
the associated virtue of temperance. In each case, the virtue is a 
disposition to the mean with respect to a morally neutral emotion 
with associated vices of excess and deficiency. 
The intellectual virtues are dispositional qualities of mind. 
Among the intellectual virtues are sophia or theoretical wisdom 
and phronesis or practical wisdom. Theoretical wisdom is roughly 
the ability to think well about complex and abstract matters. Thus 
theoretical wisdom facilitates the mastery of mathematics or 
complex legal doctrines. Practical wisdom can be understood in 
various ways, but the model theory adopts the perceptual account 
offered by Nancy Sherman.35 Humans with phronesis are able to 
perceive the morally salient aspect of a choice situation and to 
identify workable responses. A phronimos, a human with the 
 
 35. NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER (1989). 
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virtue of justice, possesses what we might call “moral vision”—a 
perceptual capacity that confers practical wisdom. 
The virtue of justice is especially important for republican 
constitutionalism. Unpacking the virtue of justice is a large 
project,36 but on this occasion, I will limit my discussion to a single 
core idea: justice is a disposition to internalize widely shared and 
deeply held social norms (or nomoi) that are consistent with 
human flourishing. We can call this conception of the virtue of 
justice, Justice as Lawfulness, where the term lawfulness is 
understood in a wide sense that includes social norms and positive 
enactments—to the extent that such enactments are recognized as 
authoritative by the relevant social norms. It is important to 
understand that on this account, the virtue of justice does not 
consist in disposition towards doing what is fair or morally best. 
Indeed, doing what you personally believe is morally best when 
that would be contrary to the nomoi is to act unjustly—given the 
account of justice assumed by the model theory. 
B. TWO ROLES FOR VIRTUE: ENDS AND MEANS 
What role should virtue play in a republican constitution? 
The thesis developed in the discussion that follows is that virtue 
can and should play two distinct roles—both as the means by 
which republican government can function well and as the end to 
which republican government should aspire. Each role is 
examined in turn. 
1. Virtue as the Means for Republican Government 
Both democratic constitutionalism and republican 
constitutionalism agree on a basic principle, which might be called 
the Principle of Self-Government. This principle is founded on the 
idea that citizens govern themselves through institutions 
established by the constitution (the fundamental institutions that 
establish the framework for legislation, execution, and 
adjudication). Democratic constitutionalism as Barnett 
understands it, emphasizes collective self-government; the 
fundamental institutions of self-government are majoritarian or 
super-majoritarian. Republican constitutionalism emphasizes 
government of the individual by the individual. For a republican 
 
 36. See Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice: An Aretaic Account of the Virtue of 
Lawfulness in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE (2007). 
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constitution on Barnett’s account, the fundamental institutions of 
self-government are judicially-enforceable, liberty-protecting 
rights and institutional arrangements of executive and legislative 
power that aim to minimize rights violations and thereby preserve 
individual self-government. Within the American tradition of 
constitutionalism, we find both republican and democratic 
elements. Our constitutional tradition includes both the Ninth 
Amendment and McCulloch v. Maryland,37 both the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Slaughter-house Cases,38 both West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette39 and Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Oklahoma, Inc.40 Barnett’s aim is to draw the republican strands 
together and articulate the republican conception of the Principle 
of Self Government—which we might call the Republican 
Principle of Self Government. 
Well-functioning self-government, on either the republican 
or the democratic conception, involves the participation of both 
citizens and officials in the process of governance. Constitutions 
are not machines that would go of themselves (to borrow and 
adapt Michael Kammen’s felicitous phrase41): self-government 
cannot survive, much less function well, if officials and citizens are 
corrupt. Even the most democratic constitution can self-destruct, 
transforming majoritarian democracy into authoritarian 
dictatorship—if the executive is a demagogue and the people are 
consumed by hatred and fear. Even the most perfect republican 
constitution will go off the tracks if the high courts are populated 
by ideologues or cowards—who sanction the destruction of liberty 
to assuage fear of foreign or domestic terrorists and sacrifice 
checks and balances and the separation of powers for the 
expediency of achieving the agenda of the ruling coalition. 
A well functioning republican constitution requires virtuous 
citizens and virtuous officials. Although this thesis is advanced 
here as part of a sketch of a contemporary version of republican 
constitutionalism, it bears important affinities to ideas expressed 
at the founding of the American republic. But please remember, 
 
 37. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 38. Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 39. West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 40. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 41. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986). 
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these are only affinities, and the discussion that follows is not 
offered as intellectual history. 
James Madison in the Virginia ratifying convention provided 
a formulation of this idea: 
But I go on this great republican principle, that the people will 
have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. 
Is there no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a 
wretched situation. No theoretical checks, no form of 
government, can render us secure. To suppose that any form of 
government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue 
in the people, is a chimerical idea. If there be sufficient virtue 
and intelligence in the community, it will be exercised in the 
selection of these men; so that we do not depend on their 
virtue, or put confidence in our rulers, but in the people who 
are to choose them.42 
A similar idea was expressed by Madison in The Federalist: 
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a 
certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are 
other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion 
of esteem and confidence. Republican government 
presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree 
than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn 
by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses 
of the human character, the inference would be, that there is 
not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that 
nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them 
from destroying and devouring one another.43 
To be clear, I do not claim that the account of republican 
constitutionalism developed here was present in the Founding 
era. In fact, I strongly doubt it could have been: the Framers surely 
had access to Aristotle’s writings about ethics and politics and to 
the political history of the Roman Republic,44 but they surely were 
not acquainted with the revival of virtue ethics that began in the 
1950s—unless they possessed a time machine of which we are now 
unaware. The point of invoking the role of virtue in early 
American republican constitutional thought is to show that the 
 
 42. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 536–37 (1827). 
 43. THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 44. See CARL J. RICHARD, GREEKS & ROMANS BEARING GIFTS: HOW THE 
ANCIENTS INSPIRED THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2009) (describing influence of Greek and 
Roman thought on the founders). 
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notion that virtue is a means to the effectiveness of republican 
constitutionalism is part of a family of republican theories that 
includes members from the Founding era. 
Although founding era writings are replete with references 
to the idea that virtue is an essential precondition to the success 
of a republican constitution, this idea is sometimes submerged by 
an anachronistic reading of founding-era constitutional theory 
that more closely resembles contemporary public choice theory 
than it does the civic republican tradition.45 It is true that 
Federalist 10 states, “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at 
the helm.”46 But this does not entail the further conclusion that a 
republican constitution can function properly with a vicious 
citizenry and vicious officials. The Constitution of 1789 along with 
the articles of amendment that we now know as the Bill of Rights 
are, in my opinion, best understood as an attempt to make self-
governance by virtuous citizens and officials resilient—able for 
some time to withstand a storm of vice or a drought of virtue. 
Republican self-government cannot long endure long-run global 
character change that produces a thoroughly corrupt citizenry and 
officialdom. 
In a well-functioning republic, citizens need the moral and 
intellectual virtues—in sufficient numbers and to a sufficient 
degree. This means that most (or at least many) citizens must 
possess courage and good temper—the ability to put fear in its 
proper perspective and to withstand a demagogic politics of anger 
and hate. 
 
 45. John A. Ferejohn & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Publius’s Political Science (February 
1, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2712933. The following 
passage illustrates their interpretation of the political science of the The Federalist: 
Publius’s lasting contribution, one that both Hamilton and Madison could 
embrace, was a vision of institutional design that was based on a realistic, if 
pessimistic, view of human nature—one that regarded a competent and well-
structured government as a means to pursue genuinely common interests. From 
this viewpoint, it is a virtue of a set of institutions that they are stable or self-
enforcing and, given his view of human nature, it seemed natural to seek to obtain 
this stability by enlisting man’s lower capacities – ambition, jealousy, inflated self-
regard, self-dealing—to accomplish these necessary tasks. Institutions, so 
designed, seem well suited to work among individuals who must be taken largely 
as they are found. This vision of institutional design still inspires us as political 
scientists. 
On this occasion, I cannot engage directly with Ferejohn and Hills’ reading of The 
Federalist—except to note the obvious point that their reading fails to explain the plain 
and obvious meaning of many passages—including the passage quoted above. 
 46. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60. (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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In a well-functioning republic, most (or at least many) 
officials must be virtuous—again, in sufficient numbers and to a 
sufficient degree. The dangers of official corruption are so 
obvious that they hardly need to be cataloged. The world is filled 
with societies with sham constitutions47—filled with checks and 
balances and high-minded declarations of rights, while in practice 
the form of government is authoritarian dictatorship or oligarchy, 
and liberty is scarce or nonexistent. 
We can use judges to illustrate the idea that officials must be 
virtuous. Consider first the virtue of Justice as Lawfulness. A 
virtuous judge must be lawful—must respect and internalize the 
widely shared and deeply held social norms of the community and 
the positive laws that are recognized as authoritative by those 
norms. Put another way, a judge with the virtue of Justice as 
Lawfulness internalizes the nomoi: such a judge is a nominos. This 
means that virtuous judges do not view their role as promoting 
their own vision of the best society—their role is to serve the law 
and not the moral philosophy or political ideology to which they 
adhere. 
And virtuous judges must possess the other virtues as well. 
Lawfulness cannot be served by judges who are cowards, hateful, 
greedy, or indolent. Lawfulness needs the support of the 
intellectual virtues as well. Judges without theoretical wisdom will 
fail to understand the law. Judges without practical wisdom will 
not be able to apply the law correctly or to recognize those rare 
and exceptional circumstances where equity will correct the letter 
of the law to serve its spirit. 
As it goes with judges, so it goes with other officials, from 
presidents to senators, from governors to county clerks, from 
cabinet members to administrative law judges. A corrupt 
officialdom can undermine the most republican of constitutions. 
2. Virtue as the End of Republican Government 
 
“Laws for the encouragement of virtue, and prevention 
of vice and immorality, shall be made and constantly kept 
 
 47. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CAL. L. REV. 863, 
865–66 (2013) (“Sometimes, constitutions lie. Anecdotal examples abound of ‘sham’ or 
‘façade’ constitutions that fail to constrain or even describe the powers of the state.”). 
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in force, and provision shall be made for their due 
execution.” 
—Constitution of Pennsylvania (1776)48 
 
 The model theory of human flourishing and the virtues has 
an obvious implication for the normative theory of legislation.49 
Legislation should aim at the promotion of human flourishing. 
Human flourishing requires peace and prosperity, so legislation 
should aim at the elimination of violence and poverty. Human 
flourishing requires lives of rational and social activity, so 
legislation should aim at creating vibrant communities with 
opportunities for meaningful work and play that engage our 
rational capacities. Human flourishing requires the virtues, so 
legislation should aim at creating the conditions for healthy 
emotional and intellectual development. Let us call this 
component of republican constitutionalism the Aretaic Theory of 
Legislation. 
How can legislation promote flourishing and virtue? Begin 
by considering the role of law in providing the preconditions of 
flourishing, peace and prosperity. 
a) Promoting the preconditions of human flourishing 
 
“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a 
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote 
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty 
to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish 
this Constitution for the United States of America.” 
—Constitution of the United States of America50 
 
Happiness or eudaimonia consists in “living well and doing 
well,” as Aristotle is sometimes translated.51 Peace and prosperity 
 
 48. Constitution of Pennsylvania § 45 (1776). Similar provisions are found in other 
early state constitutions. 
 49. As mentioned above, the account that follows draws heavily on prior work, 
especially Solum, supra note 27. 
 50. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 51. For the Greek, see ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, ch. iv, 1095a15–20 
(H. Rackham trans., Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, rev. ed. 1934). 
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are (usually and in some sense, almost always) preconditions for 
lives lived well. It seems uncontroversial that peace and prosperity 
are conducive to a flourishing life. Violence and poverty limit 
human possibilities in significant ways. Pervasive violence will 
result in significant pain and suffering, disabling injuries, and 
death. Severe poverty can result in malnutrition, starvation, and 
many other afflictions. Even if peace and prosperity were not 
preconditions for the development of the human excellences, 
legislation would still properly aim at the creation and 
maintenance of these conditions as constituent elements of 
flourishing human lives. 
But peace and prosperity are also important because of the 
role they play in the development of human capacities. Emotional 
and intellectual growth is likely to be stunted under conditions of 
pervasive violence and poverty. Children who grow up in chaotic 
and violent conditions are likely to suffer from emotional 
problems that make the acquisition of courage, good temper, and 
temperance less likely. Disorder undermines the processes of 
intellectual growth that produce practical and theoretical wisdom. 
And it seems likely that poverty will have similar effects. Extreme 
deprivation during childhood and adolescence is not conducive to 
healthy emotional or intellectual development. 
Finally, peace and prosperity create the conditions in which 
rational and social human activities are likely or possible. Of 
course, many different activities are rational or social, or both. 
The lives of a craftsperson, merchant, engineer, computer 
programmer, scholar, or public servant all can involve rational 
and social activities that express the human excellences. Both 
vocations and avocations can involve such activity: playing a 
musical instrument, painting, photography, sport, and perhaps 
even participation in a fantasy football league, as well as countless 
other activities outside of work, can form parts of flourishing 
human lives. Peace and prosperity facilitate these activities by 
creating opportunities for meaningful employment and by 
creating the time and resources that enable meaningful 
avocational pursuits. 
 
Irwin as well as Broadie and Rowe use “living well and doing well.” See ARISTOTLE, 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 97 (Sarah Broadie & Christopher Rowe trans., Oxford University 
Press 2002); ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 5 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett 1985). 
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How can legislation promote peace and prosperity? For the 
most part, this important question is outside the scope of this 
essay. Some answers to this question are obvious. The criminal 
law should forbid and punish violence. The law of nations should 
forbid aggressive wars. Other answers are more controversial. 
What institutional arrangements are conducive to the kind of 
prosperity that enables flourishing? Some believe that the answer 
to this question involves a minimalist state that creates the 
conditions for laissez-faire markets and private ownership of the 
means of production and that maximizes free choice by 
consumers and workers. Others believe that market capitalism 
results in harsh conditions for workers and the promotion of 
mindless consumption that is inconsistent with capitalism. There 
are many other possibilities, but the choice between the feasible 
alternatives depends on the answers to complex empirical 
questions that are far outside the scope of this essay. 
Nonetheless, the Aretaic Theory of Legislation can and 
should address questions about the kind of peace and prosperity 
that is conducive to human flourishing. It might be the case that 
stability could be maximized and violence minimized by an 
authoritarian social order that would undermine flourishing in 
other ways. Certainly, flourishing would be undermined by a 
police state that controls violence through fear and intimidation 
created by a system of secret police, informants, and mass 
surveillance. Likewise, the kind of prosperity that enables human 
flourishing might differ from simple maximization of gross 
domestic product. Meaningful work and a proper life-work 
balance might be more conducive to human flourishing than 
alternatives that aim only to maximize income measured in purely 
monetary terms. Legislation should aim at the right kind of peace 
and prosperity, and the kind that is right will support rational and 
social human activities that express the human excellences. 
b) Facilitating the development and acquisition of the virtues 
Legislation should facilitate the development and acquisition 
of the virtues. How can this be accomplished? Again, this is a 
complex empirical question. To give a fully adequate answer, we 
would need to understand the cognitive, social, and 
developmental psychology of the virtues. Given the current state 
of neuroscience, cognitive science, and the social sciences, it 
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seems likely that there is a good deal of uncertainty about the 
mechanisms by which the virtues are acquired. 
Despite this uncertainty, we may be able to develop working 
hypotheses. It seems likely that nurturing family environments 
facilitate healthy emotional development by children. Therefore, 
legislation should aim at conditions in which children are attached 
to stable, loving family environments. Similarly, the law should 
aim to prevent domestic violence and child abuse. Moreover, 
nurturing families may be fostered by generous family leave 
policies and undermined by working conditions that do not permit 
parents (and other caretakers) to spend time with children. 
The primary strategies for facilitating the development and 
acquisition of the virtues seem likely to be indirect. One can 
imagine a more direct approach. The law might command parents 
to engage in childrearing activities that will promote healthy 
intellectual and emotional development by children. Or the law 
could command that a certain number of hours per week be spent 
by parents in particular ways: two hours of reading stories, four 
hours of adult-child playtime, seven hours of family mealtime, and 
so forth. An army of social workers might employ electronic 
surveillance and instructional home visits to enforce these 
commands. But it seems unlikely that the direct approach would 
actually work. Common sense suggests that laws mandating 
specific parenting practices would likely do more harm than good. 
c) Establishing the infrastructure for meaningful work and 
recreation 
How can the law promote rational and social activities that 
express the human excellences? Again, the answer depends on 
complex empirical questions. The goal is to provide a social 
structure that supports meaningful work and play. 
Human history suggests that some forms of economic 
organization are better than others in meeting this goal. Modern 
developed societies (e.g., France, Japan, and Norway) may have 
serious flaws, but they seem to do a better job at providing 
opportunities for rational and social activities that express the 
human excellences than did the feudal societies of Europe in the 
so-called Dark Ages or the Soviet Union under Stalin. But there 
is likely to be substantial debate about the comparative merits of 
Scandinavian-style social democracy versus the more market-
oriented approach in the United States. From the perspective of 
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an aretaic theory of legislation, the question is, “What form of 
social organization best supports human flourishing?” 
The Aretaic Theory of Legislation sets the goal—providing 
opportunities for rational and social activities that express the 
human excellences. Various configurations of employment law, 
labor law, property law, and so forth will do better or worse at 
meeting this goal. The question as to which configuration is best 
will depend on the answers to empirical questions that are outside 
the scope of a normative theory of legislation. 
d) Legislation and the virtue of justice as lawfulness 
The discussion of virtue as the end of law has not yet 
considered the virtue of justice. But if justice is a virtue, then it 
surely has implications for the ends of law. Recall that we are 
assuming a particular account of the virtue of justice, Justice as 
Lawfulness. The core idea is that justice is a disposition to be 
lawful, but in a special sense that departs from the idea that 
lawfulness reduces to a disposition to obey the positive law. This 
departure is illuminated by substituting a stipulated concept of a 
nomos for the notion of positive law. Let us use the term nomoi 
in this stipulated sense to refer to the deeply held and widely 
shared social norms of a community with human flourishing. The 
positive laws of a given community can play a role similar to the 
nomoi to the extent that they are promulgated by institutions or 
persons whose authority is recognized by the relevant social 
norms and so long as the content of the positive laws is consistent 
with substantive content of the system of nomoi. Many positive 
laws correspond directly to widely shared and deeply held social 
norms that clearly promote human flourishing: laws prohibiting 
murder and theft are like this. There are other laws and social 
norms where their relationship to human flourishing is 
contestable, but with respect to which, one cannot say that they 
are clearly contrary to human flourishing. 
Other positive laws create new conventional rules that are 
consistent with the nomoi, but not required by them, for example, 
the traffic laws requiring that automobiles be driven on the left in 
the United Kingdom and on the right in most other nations. Once 
established as positive law by authority-recognizing nomoi, these 
rules may be internalized and become nomoi (widely shared and 
deeply held social norms). 
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Yet another possibility is that the positive law may directly 
conflict with the nomoi: in this case, there are further possibilities, 
corresponding to different ways in which the nomoi and the 
positive law can interact. The positive law may act as a technology 
of normative change—dislodging entrenched social norms 
through coercion, education, or some other mechanism. But 
another possibility is that the positive law may coexist with 
contrary social norms. Again, various consequences may follow. 
The positive law may simply fail to function to guide behavior: in 
the extreme case, even officials may subvert the positive law. Or 
the positive law may function imperfectly, with a subgroup of 
officials complying with (or even internalizing) the positive law 
while most members of the community resist, disobeying the law 
except in cases where the threat of punishment is sufficient to 
coerce compliance. 
There is no guarantee that the social norms of a particular 
community at a particular time are consistent with human 
flourishing. From the perspective of virtue jurisprudence, we 
might say that these social norms are not true nomoi—they are 
social norms that undermine the function of law: the promotion 
of human flourishing. The problem of distinguishing true from 
false nomoi is a problem of knowledge and epistemic virtue. In 
some cases, even fully virtuous humans (the phronomoi who 
possess all the virtues including practical wisdom) may have 
mistaken empirical beliefs but lack knowledge of the facts that 
would correct their mistakes. 
Republican constitutionalism requires that the law aim at the 
inculcation and preservation of the virtue of lawfulness and 
therefore that the laws should not undermine lawfulness. This 
means that lawmakers must take widely shared and deeply held 
social norms into account when they legislate. The decision to 
legislate in a way that is inconsistent with the widely shared and 
deeply held social norms of a community should not be taken 
lightly and should be limited to cases where it is clear that these 
norms substantially undermine human flourishing and hence are 
not true nomoi. 
C. SUMMARIZING THE ROLE OF VIRTUE IN REPUBLICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
At this point, a summary may be helpful. There are many 
possible republican constitutionalisms and each version might 
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have its own view of the role of virtue. The version that I have 
sketched here draws on the Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and 
deploys a theory of human excellence with three foundational 
ideas: (1) the moral virtues are dispositions connected to the 
human emotions with courage and good temper as examples; (2) 
the intellectual virtues are dispositions connected to human 
reason with theoretical and practical wisdom as examples; (3) the 
virtue of Justice as Lawfulness involves respect for and the 
internalization of the nomoi--the widely shared and deeply held 
social norms governing human interaction that are consistent with 
and a precondition of human flourishing. 
A republican constitution views the virtues as means and 
ends. The virtues are the essential means to self-government; a 
well-functioning republican constitution requires that both 
citizens and officials possess the virtues to a sufficient degree. The 
virtues are the end of a republican constitution: the aim of 
legislation should be to promote human flourishing, and that 
requires the acquisition, maintenance, and exercise of the virtues. 
Thus, the inculcation of virtue should be a central aim of a 
republican constitutional order. This goal might be explicitly 
stated, as in the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution, quoted above. 
Or it might be implicit in the general commitment to the general 
welfare. Not every constitutional commitment need be stated in a 
preamble or operationalized through a clause. In our federal 
system, the promotion of healthy families and effective 
educational systems operates primarily at the state level—and 
hence it is in state constitutions and state legislation that we 
should expect to find evidence of the republican commitment to 
promotion of virtue as the fundamental end of law. 
II. REPUBLICAN LIBERTY 
What about liberty? Barnett’s conception of republican 
constitutionalism puts liberty on center stage—as does the 
Preamble when it posited securing the “blessings of liberty” as 
one of the reasons for which “We the People” ordained and 
established the Constitution. On Barnett’s understanding, a 
republican constitution is based on the idea of individual 
sovereignty—government for and by “We the People, each and 
every one.” Liberty is the guarantor and expression of individual 
sovereignty. But what is liberty? A familiar view emphasizes what 
are sometimes called “negative rights” or “noninterference 
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rights”—examples of such rights may include many of the liberties 
enumerated in the United States Constitution, including, for 
example, freedom of speech, the right to bear arms, and the right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The unenumerated 
right to privacy might be another example. But these are merely 
examples. There is a deep question lurking here: what is the 
fundamental nature of liberty—the deep structure and not the 
surface structure? 
One answer to that question is found in republican political 
theory, which has a distinct and well developed conception of 
“republican freedom” or “republican liberty.” Here is how Pettit 
introduces and articulates the central idea: 
Think of how you feel when your welfare depends on the 
decision of others and you have no comeback against that 
decision. You are in a position where you will sink or swim, 
depending on their say-so. And you have no physical or legal 
recourse, no recourse even in a network of mutual friends, 
against them. You are in their hands. 
In any case of this kind you will be dominated by others, being 
in a position where those others have the power of interfering 
in your life in a certain way: and this, more or less arbitrarily; 
more or less at will and with impunity. If you do escape ill 
treatment, then, that will be by the grace or favour of the 
powerful, or by your own good fortune in being able to stay out 
of their way or keep them sweet. And even if you are lucky 
enough to escape such treatment, you will still live under the 
mastery of those others: they will occupy the position of 
a dominus -- the Latin word for master -- in your life.52 
Frank Lovett offers a more abstract version of this 
conception of liberty: 
The republican conception of political liberty . . . defines 
freedom as a sort of structural independence—as the condition 
of not being subject to the arbitrary or uncontrolled power of a 
master. Pettit, who has done more than anyone else to develop 
this republican conception of freedom philosophically, puts it 
thus: a person or group enjoys freedom to the extent that no 
other person or group has “the capacity to interfere in their 
affairs on an arbitrary basis.”53 
 
 52. See Pettit, supra note 22. 
 53. See Lovett, supra note 22 (quoting Pettit, supra note 24, at 165). 
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Let us use the phrase, the Republican Conception of Liberty 
to refer to this idea. At this point, I am sure that most readers have 
leapt ahead of my exposition and recognized the connection 
between the republican conception of liberty and the Republican 
Principle of Self Government. Self-government requires 
republican liberty. We cannot govern ourselves if we are mastered 
by others. And republican liberty requires self-government. We 
cannot be free from domination by others unless we are self 
governing. 
Moreover, virtue is a requisite for republican liberty in two 
important ways. The first relationship is between the virtue of 
citizens and self-government. The second relationship is between 
the virtue of officials and the protection of republican liberty. 
Consider each of these two relationships. 
First, negative legal rights against government and private 
actors (noninterference rights) are not a sufficient condition for 
republican liberty—although they may be a necessary condition. 
Human beings are resilient creatures. It is possible for some 
humans to remain self-governing under even the most repressive 
of political regimes. Even in a totalitarian state, courageous 
citizens maintain their integrity and organize to struggle against 
repression. But despite their resilience and capacity for resistance, 
human beings are vulnerable creatures—and this vulnerability 
can be exploited by a regime that systematically undermines the 
virtue of citizens by creating a culture of corruption, fear, and 
hatred. My reading of the lessons of human history (and especially 
the grand sweep of the twentieth century) is that human virtue 
can be successfully attacked: the character of the citizenry can be 
deliberately debased, resulting in a loss of the capacity for self-
government. The virtue of citizens is a prerequisite for republican 
self-government; constitutional provisions that aim to protect the 
republican conception of liberty go hand in glove with virtue to 
protect the capacity of citizens to engage in meaningful self-
government and hence to serve as individual sovereigns. We can 
summarize the way that virtue is required for republican liberty in 
the slogan: republican liberty requires rights plus virtuous citizens 
and officials. 
Second, a constitutional scheme for the protection of rights 
(whether in the form of judicially enforceable individual rights or 
in the form of structural arrangements designed to minimize 
rights violations) does not provide a sufficient guarantee that 
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rights will not be violated. Even the best constitution can be 
subverted by corrupt officials. We have already noted the 
existence of sham constitutions.54 In many cases, such 
constitutions may have been drafted as constitutional Potemkin 
villages—all flash, no cash. But this is not the only causal pathway 
to a sham constitution. A well-functioning republican constitution 
can be undermined by pervasive corruption of public officials. 
Perhaps the Weimer Republic,55 which I believe functioned for a 
time to preserve a substantial degree of protection for republican 
liberty, is an example of republican constitutionalism 
degenerating into sham constitutionalism—with the ascent of a 
demagogue to national power and the systematic population of 
officialdom by individuals whose characters can only be described 
as vicious—in the Aristotelian sense of that word. 
What are the implications of the Republican Conception of 
Liberty for republican constitutionalism? This is a large topic and 
a comprehensive account is far beyond the scope of a short essay. 
Nonetheless, a list of some implications can be offered. Consider 
the following ideas: 
• Republican liberty requires that society be organized in 
such a way that individuals and their communities will 
flourish; hence, peace and prosperity are prerequisites 
for freedom. 
• Republican liberty requires that society be organized in 
such a way that individuals develop the capacity for self-
government; the formation of virtuous character should 
be a central aim of legislation, especially in the realm of 
the family and the educational system. 
• Republican liberty requires the creation of conditions 
under which individuals can become economically self-
reliant and independent of others, masters of their own 
lives and not depend on either government or a private 
entity to the degree that they become mastered by 
others. 
Even this very sketchy list of republican ideas about liberty 
and the role of government should suffice to make it clear that 
republican liberty requires more than negative rights. Republican 
 
 54. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 47. 
 55. See generally JOHN HIDEN, THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC (2d. ed. 1996) (discussing 
the history of the Weimar Republic). 
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liberty depends on a sufficient degree of human flourishing and 
on virtuous citizens and officials. 
But from the fact that republican liberty requires more than 
negative rights, it does not follow that any particular list of 
constitutional rights or particular doctrines about the 
arrangement of governmental institutions is required. Republican 
liberty might be consistent with judicially enforceable positive 
rights—such as the rights to education found in many state 
constitutions.56 Likewise, it might be the case that republican 
liberty requires a strong national government with the power to 
overcome collective-action problems among the states in order to 
create the conditions for human flourishing. The word “might” in 
the prior two sentences reflects the fact that complex empirical 
and theoretical questions must be answered before we can reach 
conclusions about these topics. Some believe that the promotion 
of republican virtue and republican liberty is best realized under 
conditions that approximate the social arrangements in 
contemporary Scandinavian societies; others believe that the 
expanded role of government in these societies creates the risk of 
tyrannical government and undermines rather than enhances the 
capacities of individual citizens for self-government. The 
resolution of these questions requires a turn to social science and 
social theory. They cannot be answered by constitutional theory 
or political philosophy. 
III. REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
What are the implications of republican liberty and 
republican virtue for republican constitutionalism in the here and 
now? How do these ideas intersect with the great constitutional 
questions of our day? We live in an era that is rife with 
constitutional controversy. Originalism and living 
constitutionalism contend for the title of best theory of 
constitutional interpretation and construction. Unenumerated 
rights are endlessly debated. The consensus favoring the New 
Deal constitutional settlement—with its associated ideas of 
plenary and virtually unlimited national power and the judicially 
created constitutional foundations for the administrative state—
 
 56. For a discussion of positive state constitutional rights, see Lawrence Friedman, 
Testing the Limits: Judicial Enforcement of Positive State Constitutional Rights, 53 DUQ. L. 
REV. 437 (2015). 
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has begun to crack.57 These big questions may be associated with 
the fundamental debate between republican constitutionalism 
and democratic constitutionalism. At a surface level, the 
democratic constitution seems consistent with living 
constitutionalism, a limited set of judicially enforceable rights, 
and the New Deal constitutional settlement. 
What about republican constitutionalism? On this occasion, 
I will discuss only the question concerning the relationship 
between republicanism and debates about constitutional 
interpretation and construction. The form of republicanism 
developed in this essay is committed to the idea that citizens and 
officials (especially judges) should possess the virtue of Justice as 
Lawfulness—respect for the nomoi or widely shared and deeply 
held social norms that are consistent with and enable human 
flourishing. Does the virtue of lawfulness have implications for 
the great debate over originalism and living constitutionalism? 
Big question! In the paragraphs that follow, I will sketch an 
answer that draws on my work on originalist constitutionalist 
theory—particularly on an unpublished work-in-progress, The 
Constraint Principle.58 
Let us stipulate at the beginning that originalism is a family 
of constitutional theories that accept two ideas: (1) the Fixation 
Thesis (the communicative content of the constitutional text is 
fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified), and (2) 
the Constraint Principle (constitutional practice ought to be 
consistent with the fixed communicative content). Let us further 
stipulate two ideas that not all originalists accept: (3) the Public 
Meaning Thesis (the original meaning of the constitutional text is 
its public meaning), and (4) the Interpretation-Construction 
Distinction (interpretation is the discovery of communicative 
content, while construction is the determination of legal effect 
including the legal content of constitutional doctrine and the 
decision of constitutional cases). Finally, let us further stipulate 
that (5) “living constitutionalism” is a family of theories organized 
around the idea that the legal content of constitutional doctrine 
should change in response to changing circumstances and values, 
and (6) any theory that denies either the Fixation Thesis or the 
Constraint Principle is a form of “nonoriginalism.” 
 
 57. See Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that NFIB may alter the constitutional gestalt). 
 58. Manuscript on file with the author. 
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For the purpose of this discussion, I will set aside a group of 
compatibilist theories that accept fixation and constraint but 
accept a large role for reliance by judges on their own beliefs 
about political morality in what I have called “construction 
zones”—areas in which the original meaning of the constitutional 
text is underdeterminate because of vagueness, open texture, or 
irreducible ambiguity: Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism may be 
an example.59 Instead, we will focus on theories of nonoriginalist 
forms of living constitutionalism, which reject the Constraint 
Principle. Such theories posit a Supreme Court with the power to 
adopt amending constructions—that is, doctrines of constitutional 
law that are inconsistent with the text and hence that amount to 
constitutional amendments in substance but not in form. 
Republican constitutionalism better coheres with originalism 
than it does with nonoriginalist living constitutionalism. Two of 
the arguments that will be presented in The Constraint Principle 
illustrate the connections between republican virtue and 
republican liberty with the normative claim that officials 
(including Justices of the Supreme Court) should consider 
themselves bound by the original meaning of the constitutional 
text. These arguments are sketchy and underdeveloped, but on 
this occasion they are offered only as illustrations of the way in 
which republican virtue and republican liberty connect republican 
constitutional theory to originalism. 
First, consider republican virtue and in particular the virtue 
of Justice as Lawfulness. By way of example, we can focus on the 
Justices of the Supreme Court. Virtuous Justices will possess all 
of the moral and intellectual virtues. They will be courageous and 
good tempered. They will be both theoretically and practically 
wise. And they will possess the virtue of Justice as Lawfulness—
the disposition to respect and internalize the nomoi, the widely 
shared and deeply held social norms of Americans, including the 
authority-recognizing norms. Let us make an assumption that I 
believe is quite reasonable, but which could be contested.60 The 
 
 59. JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
 60. An argument could be made that the relevant nomos is that the Supreme Court 
of the United States is the ultimate authority in our constitutional system. If this were 
correct, then common-law constitutionalism and not originalism would be supported by 
the virtue of justice as fairness. The case for the position presented in text and against 
common-law constitutionalism involves a variety of complex issues. For an investigation 
that does not employ the republican and virtue-theoretic framework deployed in this essay, 
see William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015). 
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assumption is that there is a nomos (a widely shared and deeply 
held social norm) that recognizes the authority of the United 
States Constitution (the document that is under glass in the 
National Archives plus the amendments) as the supreme law of 
the land. Justices with the virtue of Justice as Lawfulness will 
internalize and respect this nomos and hence will accept that they 
are bound by the original meaning of the constitutional text. 
Many forms of nonoriginalist living constitutionalism seem to 
clearly reject the binding authority of the United States 
Constitution, and in particular, the view that Supreme Court 
Justices should directly resort to their own view of political 
morality is inconsistent with the virtue of Justice as Lawfulness. 
The view that Justices of the Supreme Court are unconstrained by 
the constitutional text is a form of lawlessness—no Justice with 
the virtue of lawfulness could hold such a view. 
Second, consider republican liberty and originalism. 
Nonoriginalist living constitutionalism ultimately makes the 
scope of our freedom depend on the decisions of the Supreme 
Court. Because of the nature of the Supreme Court as an 
institution, the Court imposes its views about the scope of our 
freedom on a case-by-case basis, deciding individual controversies 
and not formally amending the Constitution itself. By itself, that 
would not necessarily entail that the Court is not bound by the 
rule of law—because the Court could be bound by precedent. But 
of course, the Court does not consider itself bound by its own 
prior decisions; it retains the power to overrule its prior decisions, 
although it may consider the existence of precedent as one of 
many factors that it takes into account when rendering 
constitutional judgments. Bound by neither text nor precedent, 
the Supreme Court rules by decree—with the power to change the 
structure of government and the shape (or even the existence) of 
our freedoms whenever it chooses to do so. In other words, a 
nonoriginalist living constitutionalist Supreme Court is our 
master. Of course, our master may be kind. The Court may decide 
to conditionally grant us certain liberties. It may give us freedom 
of contract in one decision, and take it away in another. It may 
give women the right to choose whether to carry their pregnancies 
to term but then functionally nullify that right in a case decided 
the very next term—especially if the composition of the Court has 
changed. Today, it may provide a right to same-sex marriage, but 
tomorrow, who knows? It will depend on who is appointed to the 
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Court. Republican liberty is not consistent with a committee of 
nine unelected masters. Aristotle used the word tyranny for rule 
by decree. A Supreme Court that is not bound by the Constitution 
is a tyrant in the Aristotelian sense of that word.61 
CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM 
RECONSIDERED 
Let me conclude by offering some thoughts about democratic 
constitutionalism. The purest version of democratic 
constitutionalism in the history of American constitutional 
thought might be restated as “unconstrained Thayerianism”62—
the view that the Supreme Court should defer to Congress and 
that Congress should only be constrained by the requirement that 
it rule by legislation (laws of general applicability). 
Representation-reinforcement Thayerianism modifies this theory 
by giving courts a role in the enforcement of rules that protect 
democratic processes and protect discreet and insular minorities 
who are excluded from the democratic process. What should 
democratic constitutionalism think about liberty and virtue? 
Democratic constitutionalists might embrace the view that 
liberty and virtue are ultimately subject to democratic will 
formation in a very strong sense. If a democratic majority 
endorses a right, then that should be judicially enforced, but if the 
majority opposes freedom of contract or freedom of speech, then 
so be it. If a democratic majority favors human flourishing, then 
the law should promote it, but if a majority rejects the inculcation 
of virtue as the end of legislation, their will should prevail. But 
this very strong attachment to majoritarian procedures as the 
ultimate end of constitutionalism may well be rejected by many 
proponents of a democratic constitution. Joshua Cohen explored 
many of the reasons for rejecting a proceduralist conception of 
democracy in his essay, Pluralism and Proceduralism.63 
Democratic constitutionalists who embrace representation-
reinforcement rights may also embrace rights to democratic 
equality (including substantive rights to privacy and positive 
 
 61. For a discussion of Aristotle’s idea of tyranny as rule by decree, see RICHARD 
KRAUT, ARISTOTLE 105–06 (2002). 
 62. The label “unrestrained Thayerianism” is inspired by JAMES B. THAYER, THE 
ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Boston, 
Little Brown & Co. 1893). 
 63. Joshua Cohen, Pluralism and Proceduralism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 590 (1994). 
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rights to educational and economic opportunities) on the ground 
that these rights are preconditions to equal participation in the 
democratic process. But notice that if they go down this road, their 
version of democratic constitutionalism is likely to begin to 
resemble republican constitutionalism—at least at the level of 
abstract theory. It seems unlikely that democratic 
constitutionalism can do without democratic virtue—even if the 
theory of virtue that they endorse is thinner than the robust 
republican version developed in this essay. 
Moreover, democratic constitutionalists cannot help but be 
aware of the great danger associated with majoritarianism—the 
possibility that a majoritarian constitution can enable 
authoritarian politics. Some might think that this risk is 
vanishingly small under contemporary political circumstances, 
but anyone who follows contemporary politics as of the writing of 
this essay must be aware of this possibility. The dangers of 
authoritarianism highlight the core moral intuitions behind the 
republican conception of liberty. Fear and anger may lead some 
to sound a trumpet for a strong leader, but a republican 
constitutional regime that builds a reservoir of virtue among 
citizens and officials has the capacity to resist that siren song. This 
aspect of republican constitutionalism can be expressed as a 
simple and ancient proposition: virtue is required for liberty. 
 
